CLAUDE ARPI
In the recent months, China has not been cool with India. A few months ago, China asserted that Masood Azhar, the Jaish-e-Mohammed chief and Pathankot terror attack mastermind, did not qualify to be listed as a ‘terrorist’ by the UN.
When asked the reason for China’s decision in the UN Sanctions Committee to place Azhar’s name on ‘technical hold’, Liu Jieyi, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN explained: “Any listing would have to meet the requirements for blacklisting. It is the responsibility of all members of the council to make sure that these requirements are followed.”
Then, India’s bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a full-fledged member was rejected in Seoul in June. ‘One country’ wanted to play by the rules. Though Delhi has always strictly adhered to non-proliferation norms (which is not the case with China), India was not acceptable for China because Delhi is not a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT).
The Ministry of External Affairs spokesman, who usually speaks in circumvoluted terms (sorry, in ‘diplomatic language’), made it clear: “There was only ‘one country’ which persistently raised procedural hurdles, as a result of which no decision could be arrived at in Seoul.” Straight tweet! Indeed China is not cool, but a series of events forced the Mandarins in Beijing to reconsider (at least temporarily) their views on the ‘periphery’ of the Middle Kingdom and on India in particular.
The International Tribunal in The Hague announced its ruling on a reference by the Philippines over the South China Sea (SCS); the Philippines had objected to Beijing violating its sovereign rights in the SCS. The court ruled that China had no legal basis to claim any historic right to the natural resources in most areas of the SCS. It also ruled that such rights must not exceed what is permitted by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Further, there was no evidence China has historically controlled the waters or its resources exclusively.
The verdict was probably stronger than expected; Beijing was quick to release a statement on “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea.”
Another event triggered a shock in the corridors of Zhongnanhai.
On July 4, the South Korean Defence Ministry announced that Korea could share information on North Korean missile launches obtained from the radar of an advanced anti-missile system to be installed in the southern part of Korea.
The South China Morning Post commented: “The disclosure marks a reversal of the government’s stance on sharing information obtained by the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system (THAAD) with Japan. The South Korean government previously denied the possibility of sharing the radar information with Japan.”
The US THAAD system which Seoul and Washington agreed to deploy in Seongju County, North Gyeongsang Province should be operational by the end of 2017. It will be a game changer; Beijing had always counted on Seoul’s ‘neutrality’.
Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister’s visit to Delhi should be seen in this changed context. Beijing has clearly mellowed its stands: Wang Yi told his Indian counterpart Sushma Swaraj that “China is ready to build closer partnership with India, and enhance pragmatic cooperation with India in all fields.” That sounds good. According to Xinhua, Wang stated that the bilateral relations “have been making remarkable and comprehensive headways in recently years thanks to joint efforts by both sides …the complementariness of the two economies has been further tapped and a win-win cooperation pattern is taking shape.”
According to PTI, Swaraj had raised the issue of Masood Azhar as well as Beijing’s opposition to India’s NSG membership bid. For the latter issue, the two sides agreed to have a meeting soon between their top disarmament officials. Even the NSG can now be ‘discussed’! That is great. Swaraj also mentioned India’s concerns on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in PoK during their working lunch.
It was decided to set up a new mechanism at the level of Foreign Secretaries to discuss various aspects of bilateral ties which have witnessed strain in the recent past. Is it enough? Certainly not. China’s position on Kashmir and Ladakh needs to be clarified.
In July 2016, Beijing called for a “proper settlement of Kashmir clashes”, which stressing that China’s position on Kashmir has remained extremely ambiguous.
Defence analyst Monika Chansoria pointed out: “Nothing could be further from the truth than this duplicitous and outrageous statement. In fact, Beijing has shifted its position on Kashmir, gradually, yet firmly, with each passing decade.” Remember the issue of stapled visas for the J&K’s State subjects?
A move which could show China’s seriousness in normalizing the Sino-Indian relations is to reopen the Demchok-Tashigong road to Kailash-Manasarovar. It is the fastest and easiest route for pilgrims wanting to visit the Holy Mountain. It will also help to clarify Beijing’s position on Kashmir and Ladakh.
Under its One Belt, One Road scheme, China is keen to open new routes or corridors. But it seems that Beijing restricts these projects to its ‘friends’ (i.e. Pakistan and the CPEC).
Already back in 1954, when India and China were negotiating the Panchsheel Agreement, China adamantly refused to acknowledge, let alone reopen the Demchok route, simply because it still considers Ladakh a ‘disputed territory’.
The reopening of the ancient pilgrim route would be a great Confidence Building Measure (CBM) between India and China, but perhaps Beijing is not ready to give up the ‘disputed territory’ label for Ladakh.
Otherwise, where is the problem?
(The writer is a China expert and has authored many books on the subject)