ANKIT K BHATT
Examining the prospects over the civil nuclear agreement between India and Japan, it was quite natural that signing of it would predominate the news headlines. The third annual meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi was scheduled for November 11-12 with high expectations. But over-focus on the much-anticipated deal may subvert the depth of India-Japan strategic embrace that we got to witness in Prime Minister Modi’s confabulation with Abe in Tokyo during the annual bilateral summit. Going beyond bilateral commitments, India and Japan displayed eagerness to collaborate on areas of common interest at the regional level.
The civil nuclear deal was finally passed after breaking a six-year-old trammel of hesitancy which Japan, as a major victim of nuclear weapons, had to get over after working through a minefield of domestic ethical boundaries in inking such a deal with a non-NPT (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty) signatory country like India.
Foreign policies are built on mutual shared interests but not only on rhetorical claims. The signing of the agreement may have something to do with the decreased domestic demands, since after the Fukushima disaster (2011), Japan’s nuclear industry is increasingly looking for markets round the globe specifically Asia.
The bond intensified and grew stronger in scope with Modi’s arrival on Japanese soil in 2014. The more recent summit also holds significance in light of a new US President-elect and a sense of uncertainty regarding his Asian policies. As the world makes sense of Donald Trump to be the 45th US President, Japan and India might find a greater convergence in their concerns and vision for Asia. The ambience around Modi’s visit was coupled with a new descripted world order following Trump’s victory. It has clearly put the bilateral ties on unspoken conflict of interest. Both New Delhi realise that the time has come to take the alliance beyond the borders of shared interests and strike greater geo-strategic partnerships.
This deal will make it more difficult for China to keep India out of the elite NSG club because the terms of the civil nuclear deal with Japan lie within the NPT guidelines. The “termination and cessation clause” built within the agreement permits signatories to stop nuclear cooperation in case India conducts nuclear tests and hence the need for NPT is much reduced. This treaty came about as propitious moment for India, which now has the ability to exploit the success of this deal and enjoy a greater authority in calling for a position in the exclusive NSG club including India’s past memorabilia, members of which are shortly going to discuss over India’s inclusion during a meeting in Vienna. Japan backed India’s candidacy and ensured that four stages of the entire deal was squeezed into a single agreement unlike with the US.
Foreign policies are built on mutual shared interests but not only on rhetorical claims. The signing of the agreement may have something to do with the decreased domestic demands, since after the Fukushima disaster (2011), Japan’s nuclear industry is increasingly looking for markets round the globe specifically Asia.
China’s anxiety about Indo-Japanese cooperation has remained inferred. The state-controlled media came out with a series of editorials that openly warned India against aiding Japan’s line on South China Sea. They issued an open threat were such a thing to happen. For a country that regularly provokes Japan over the Senkaku islets and claims over South China Sea through a self-styled “nine-dash line”, China would be anxious with India’s stand. So far, New Delhi has shown itself to be insular to the possible threats. It is important to note the ‘China factor’ in India–Japan relations.
While growing Chinese expansion in the maritime domain is a shared concern, India’s approach is not that of reluctance. There is no denying growing Sino–Indian competition from their shared borders to the Indian Ocean, but India is not closed off to ideas coming from Beijing. New Delhi has participated in economic forum where it sees opportunity, and continues to engage in the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar economic corridor project and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
This transition from a bilateral to a regional focus is evident through the results of first two summit. The first meeting in 2014 resulted in a ‘special strategic and global partnership’ and the second in 2015 marked a vision for ‘peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and the world’.
On defence, India is expected to confirm the deal of 12 Japanese US-2 aircraft after two years of negotiations. The US-2 is an amphibian aircraft that the Indian Navy and Coast Guard will use for search and rescue operations. This will enhance India’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities in the Indian Ocean region. Maritime security is a priority area in the bilateral relationship. The idea of the Indo-Pacific binds India and Japan into one single theatre with a common security architecture. India’s statement with Japan on the Indo-Pacific reflects a great sense of co-operation between the two Asian players working together on a shared vision.
India and Japan’s strategic interests have largely coincided as both are concerned about the rise of China and its expanding strategic influence over maritime Asia. But Japan is interested in collaborating in both the Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans, while India’s interest beyond the Indian Ocean is limited.
A growing area of interests on both sides is infrastructural development building regional connectivity. A regular feature in the Modi–Abe summit has been a commitment to boost India’s infrastructure needs as well as improve connectivity between India and Southeast Asia. A key development is Japan’s investment in building infrastructure in India’s northeastern border region, home to one of the states claimed by China and a region that has been traditionally underdeveloped.
In its endeavour to emerge as a global power, India has found a credible partner in Japan, and it should continue to broaden engagement and deepen its bilateral special strategic partnership.