RAJESH SINGH
There has been a great deal of discussion over the merits and demerits of India having signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United State of America. Critics of the deal have slammed the Modi Government for ‘kowtowing’ to the US, while supporters have pointed to the ‘benefits’ the country will derive through the military agreement. What has been less debated is the signal New Delhi has given through this deal: That it will pursue an unapologetic defence diplomacy less fettered by the opinions of others and more driven by national interest.
LEMOA had been the subject of discussion during earlier Governments but could not be finalised because of largely imaginative apprehensions these regimes harboured. The first was that the deal will make India a US ‘ally’. This was of course untrue because LEMOA has been signed by dozens of nations that are not allies of the US. The second was that it would hurt China’s sensibilities. For far too many years, New Delhi had baulked at taking steps it believed would upset Beijing. The result was that we missed out on enhancing our geo-strategic footprint globally while getting nothing in return from China vis-à-vis India’s core interests. Moreover, in a world criss-crossed with both competing and complementary bilateral and multilateral arrangements, it is foolhardy to maintain LEMOA will derail the India-China engagement.
LEMOA is an indication that things have begun to change with the Modi Government, now in its third year in office. India, by virtue of its large economy (the third largest in the world), its geographical positioning, its rise in stature on the global stage, and through the robust relationships it has with nations that are often in conflict with one another, can and should leverage its strengths. It can simultaneously do business with China, build strategic partnerships with the US, Europe, Russia and nations in the Indian Ocean Region, and deal on equal terms with both Israel and Iran. This is happening now, but it could have happened earlier in more than the symbolic ways it did.
The changed, and changing, geopolitical equations offer India an opportunity to finally punch its weight, and above its weight at times. Punching below its weight, which had become a national obsession masked as ‘non-aggression’, is no longer an option. The world does not regard and respect countries that are not bold enough to take leadership positions.
There have been many instances in the past where India abandoned opportunities to make its presence felt abroad because it either failed to make up its mind, or was too meek to take the plunge, or was needlessly sensitive to others’ concerns, or was simply driven by misplaced ideology. It lost out on the development of foreign ports, on the signing of crucial defence pacts, on having military bases at strategic locations.
LEMOA is an indication that things have begun to change with the Modi Government, now in its third year in office. India, by virtue of its large economy (the third largest in the world), its geographical positioning, its rise in stature on the global stage, and through the robust relationships it has with nations that are often in conflict with one another, can and should leverage its strengths. It can simultaneously do business with China, build strategic partnerships with the US, Europe, Russia and nations in the Indian Ocean Region, and deal on equal terms with both Israel and Iran. This is happening now, but it could have happened earlier in more than the symbolic ways it did.
The resetting of India’s defence diplomacy has taken place at a time when the nation’s foreign policy drive has seen a dramatic upsurge. This is neither surprising nor coincidental. The defence push on the international stage is, after all, complementary to an overall foreign policy. So long as New Delhi basked in the ‘softly, softly” approach which the then External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid advocated and the Congress-led UPA regime pursued, there was little occasion for bold defence pacts with foreigners. The ‘don’t trust, don’t bother to verify’ mindset ensured that imaginative outreaches were culled before they could gain shape. Whether it be on agreements with Sri Lanka or Afghanistan or Vietnam, let alone the US or Israel, the instinct went in favour of hedging and delaying.
If that is now changing, LEMOA is not the only instance. India has assured a $500 million dollar credit line to Vietnam towards defence cooperation. Prime Minister Modi said the strategic partnership between the two nations had been elevated to a “comprehensive strategic partnership”. The two sides also inked a deal for the construction of offshore patrol boats. The vessels will be built by a private party from India.
This may seem routine except for the fact that Hanoi had a strategic partnership with just two nations — China and Russia. Had New Delhi demonstrated enthusiasm in engaging with Vietnam more robustly in the past, China would not have covered as much ground as it has now, minus the Indian presence. Nevertheless, India has waded into what was China’s preserve (Russia is a friend and not so much of a competitor, at least not in the sense of establishing influence at New Delhi’s cost). This is also not routine because Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Vietnam earlier this month has revived hopes of India selling BrahMos missiles to Hanoi.
Let us not forget that it was only in October 2014 that a pact between the two nations established India’s assertive but inoffensive presence in the South China Sea affairs. That Modi should have laid the ground for enhanced Indian presence in Vietnam’s defence development hours before arriving in China for the G20 summit, added pepper to the story. Finally, Modi was the first Indian Prime Minister in 15 years to visit Vietnam. That should, if nothing else, say a lot about how New Delhi had handled its defence diplomacy priorities in the past decade or so.
Progress on two other bilaterals is testimony to the un-blinkered defence diplomacy the Modi Government has adopted. The first one is India-Afghanistan and the other is India-Japan. On the latter, the Modi Government has removed the cobwebs of indecision that spread out of fear of upsetting China and then not finding international support. Modi’s tone and tenor was forthright — something completely missing in his immediate predecessor — when he spoke of nations having “tendencies towards expansionism”. Given that he said this in Japan, there was no prize for guessing which country he had in mind.
The other aspect of the India-Japan bilateral is New Delhi warming up to intense military cooperation with the Asian tiger. The previous regime has been reluctant to engage more extensively with Japan, again worried by China’s response. A few years ago, a senior Japanese naval officer had said that Tokyo had been “wanting very much” to have joint exercises with India, but “Indian politics is very complicated”. Now, Japan has been included in the Malabar exercise between India and the US. Past hesitations have dissolved.
On arming Afghanistan, New Delhi has shed its coquettishness and become bold. The UPA regime had gone only half the way after promising Kabul the moon — modern military hardware and training of Afghan defence personnel — possibly because it didn’t want to antagonise Pakistan which is determined to deny India space in the region. India is poised to give four Russian-made Mi25 helicopters to Afghanistan, a move that has riled Pakistan. Besides, Islamabad is worried about a Afghanistan-Iran-India-Russia nexus to upset its plans. But New Delhi is no longer worried about its neighbour’s worry. Indeed, more military help to Afghanistan is a distinct possibility.
All this is the tip of the iceberg. Canberra is pushing for an India-US-Australia trilateral, especially in naval cooperation. The India-US-Japan trilateral is chugging along well and could see upgrades in the coming months. Other countries wanting to ramp up defence ties with New Delhi are waiting for their turn. India’s defence diplomacy is finally coming of age.
(The writer is a senior political commentator and public affairs analyst)